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Then and Now 
Stanley Fischer 
As the republics of the former Soviet Union struggle to find a way out of the 
chaos of the unprecedented peacetime collapse of a superpower, attention inev- 
itably centers on the pressing problems of reform. But those problems arise 
within the historical context of Russian and Soviet economic development. 
The main focus of this paper is on the reform process. But I start with four 
historical questions that bear on the current situation. How advanced was Rus- 
sia in  1913? What relevance,  if  any,  does the New Economic Policy  of the 
1920s, or NEP, have for the current situation? Why did economic growth in 
the Soviet Union slow in the  1970s and  1980s? What role did Gorbachev’s 
policies play in bringing about the final collapse of the Soviet Union? 
7.1  Russia in 1913 
In 1913, Russia was a rapidly developing country whose enormous territory 
and population made it an economic and military force to be reckoned with. 
By some estimates (Gregory 1982),  its national income was at about the same 
level as that of the United Kingdom, slightly below that of Germany, and 21 
percent of  the U.S. level; Maddison,  whose estimates are presented in table 
7.1, ranks Russian GNP somewhat higher.’ The data in table 7.1 show Russia 
well behind Europe and the United States in industrial, although not agricul- 
tural, production. 
The author is grateful to Olivier Blanchard, William Easterly, Jacek Rostowski, Lawrence Sum- 
mers, and Peter Temin for comments, to Ruth Judson for research assistance, and to the National 
Science Foundation for financial support. 
1, By Maddison’s estimates, per capita Russian GDP in 1913 was at about the same level as in 
Cote d’Ivoire in 1988; his estimate for U.S. GDP in 1913 puts it at a level between Mexico and 
Taiwan in 1988. These comparisons are made assuming that the data in table 7.1 refer to Interna- 
tional Comparisons Project (1CP)-type  estimates and using the data reported in Summers and 
Heston (1991). 
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Table 7.1  Comparative Economic Performance, 1913 
Soviet  United  United 
Union  Kingdom  States 
Per capita GDP"  973  3,065  3,772 
Population (millions)  158.4  42.6  97.6 
Industrial production 




Iron and steel 
Cotton textiles 
Agricultural production 
(average 1910-1 3, 









































Sources: Now (1989) for industrial production; Mitchell (1976) for European agricultural produc- 
tion; Historical Statistics of  the United States (1975) for U.S. agricultural production; Maddison 
(1989) for GDP and population. 
"In international  1980 dollars; for 1987, Maddison shows the United States at $13,550 and the 
Soviet Union at $5,950. 
bFor  Russia: rye, barley, oats, corn; for the United Kingdom: barley, oats; for the United States: 
barley, oats, corn. 
The population in 1913 was predominantly rural, as rural as France had been 
in 1789, and agriculture still accounted for more than half the national product. 
When serfdom was abolished in 1861, the land was given to peasants in com- 
munal, not individual, ownership. Although private peasant ownership grew 
over the next half century, less than a third of peasant land was private in 1913. 
Russia had industrialized rapidly (table 7.2),  especially in the last two de- 
cades of the nineteenth century, even by comparison with Germany, and in 
those particular decades more rapidly than the United States.2 Although the 
structure of  land  tenure  inhibited  the  permanent  movement  of  labor  into 
the cities, it did not stop it; other resources for industrialization came out of the 
agricultural sector, through direct and indirect taxes, through tariffs on imports 
2. Of course, these growth rates pale by comparison with present-day rates in the newly industri- 
alizing countries (NICs); Korean industrial production grew at an average rate of 15 percent from 
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Table 7.2  The Growth of Industrial Production, 1860-1913  (% per year) 
1860-70  1870-80  1880-90  1890-1900  1900-1910  1910-13 
Russia  2.1  5.1  6.0  7.0  3.5  5.0 
Germany  3.9  2.7  4.4  4.3  3.5  5.2 
United States  4.6  5.7  5.6  3.8  5.4  5.4 
Sources: Nove (1989)  for Russia (Goldsmith data); Mitchell (1976) for Germany; Long-Term  Eco- 
nomic Growth, 1860-1970  (Washington, D.C.:  Department of Commerce, 1973), for the United 
States (Nutter data). 
destined for the rural sector, and through policies that encouraged the growth 
of agricultural exports. 
Industrial growth from 1890  took place behind import barriers3 and with the 
assistance of government investment in education and physical infrastructure. 
Gerschenkron  (1962) emphasizes  the  importance  of  access to Western,  in- 
creasingly German and American, technology. 
Russia went on the gold standard in 1897 and stayed there until World War 
I. The state bank was required at the margin to hold 100 percent gold reserves 
against its note issue, with reserves  in fact exceeding these   amount^.^  The 
country’s dependence on external financing to support industrialization is well 
known. The foreign capital inflow at the end of the czarist period is estimated 
to have averaged about 2 percent of NNP, accounting for 40 percent of indus- 
trial investment  and  15-20  percent  of  total  investment  (Gregory and Stuart 
1986, 43). The gross foreign debt to GNP ratio in 1913 was about 40 percent, 
and the net debt to exports ratio was above 400 per~ent.~  Foreign capital was 
dominant in mining, especially the oil industry, and owned over 40 percent of 
the metals industry. 
7.2  War, Revolution, and the NEP 
World War I, the Revolution, and the Civil War wreaked havoc on the econ- 
omy. A Supreme Council of National Economy, VSNKh, was set up in Decem- 
ber 1917 to run the economy. By February 1918, workers’ control over factor- 
ies had been established, land and the banks nationalized, and the foreign debt 
repudiated. Although decrees came from the center, actions were taken locally; 
the peasants redistributed land; this was a period of “elemental-chaotic prole- 
tarian nationalization from below.”6 Referring to the VSNKh, Nove (1989,44) 
states that its leaders were young intellectuals, with little grip on the realities 
3. The average tariff on manufactured goods in 1904 was 130 percent (Maddison 1969.91). 
4. Yurovsky (1925) provides an overview of monetary arrangements before World War I. 
5. Calculation based on Maddison’s (1969.91) estimate that the gross foreign debt in  1913 was 
6. Nove (1989,44), quoting a 1924 article by L. Kritsman. 
8 billion rubles and the net debt 6.5 billion. 224  Stanley Fischer 
of administration and that, “in any case, much of Russia was outside the au- 
thority of the government.” 
The problem of extracting resources from the country, to feed the towns and 
cities and to finance industrialization, is a recurring theme of Russian and early 
Soviet history. In mid-1918, all large factories were nationalized, as war com- 
munism began. In addition to nationalization of large firms, war communism 
involved a ban on private trade, forced appropriation by the Cheka and local 
officials of the rich and middle peasants’ surplus production (as defined by the 
government), and partial attempts to move to a moneyless society by rationing 
some goods, such as food, and making others, such as the mails and the trol- 
leys, free.7 Agricultural production and especially the amount available to the 
government declined, with famine-leading  to “uncounted millions” (Nove 
1989,76)  of deaths-widespread  in 1920 and 1921. 
These Bolshevik policies succeeded well enough to win the Civil War, but 
by  1921 the country had seen a phenomenal decline of  output, especially in 
industry (table 7.3), and was suffering from famine.x A rapid inflation was 
under way, with prices rising on average 1,000 percent per year between 1917 
and 1921. With the Civil War won, but barely in control of its territory, with an 
economy in shambles, facing peasant uprisings and the revolt of the Kronstadt 
garrison, the government was forced early in 1921 to beat a tactical retreat to 
the New Economic Policy. 
The NEP legalized private trade, liberalized prices, reduced the role of cen- 
tral planning, and in 1924 stabilized the currency. The Bolshevik government 
saw its key policy problems in agriculture and in distribution. Not enough food 
was coming out of the countryside to support the urban population, and not 
enough resources were coming out of agriculture to finance industrialization. 
Nove (1989, 70) quotes an ex-Menshevik taking part in a 1923 discussion (at 
a time when free discussion was still possible) on the lessons of the early post- 
revolutionary years: “The experience of the Russian revolution shows that the 
nationalization of petty trade should be the last phase of the revolution, and 
not the first.” 
Under the NEP,  state requisition of agricultural output was replaced by  a 
progressive tax, rising from 5 to 17 percent. Private trade was legalized, and 
peasants were allowed to sell their output to any purchaser. Large-scale indus- 
try, responsible for 75 percent of industrial output, remained nationalized, as 
did transportation, banking, and foreign trade. Foreign capital was invited in; 
however, despite well-known exceptions, there was very little response, with 
less than 1 percent of industrial output being produced in foreign-owned firms 
by  1928. 
7. For a review of the debate over whether war communism was a set of improvised measures, 
responding to events, or rather an ideologically motivated attempt to move rapidly to socialism, 
see Gregory and Stuart (1986,52). 
8. According to Nove (1989,57), the urban population halved between 1918 and 1920, and the 
number of  (urban) workers declined from 2.6 million in  1917 to 1.2 million in  1920. 225  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
Table 7.3  The Effect of War and Revolution 
1913  1921 
Gross industrial output:  100  31 
Coal (million tons)  29  9 
Oil (million tons)  9.2  3.8 
Iron and steel (million tons)  8.5  .3 
Agricultural output  100  60 
Imports 
Exports 
100  15.1 
100  1.3 
Source: Nove (1989, 58). 
Strategic nationalized  industries9 remained within the centralized planning 
system, but the bulk of nationalized firms were decentralized and ordered to 
operate commercially. They formed themselves into large trusts. Some nation- 
alized firms were leased to individuals and cooperatives, and smaller enter- 
prises were denationalized. Small-scale industry was dominated by the private 
sector. So too was distribution, within the industrial sector (including the distri- 
bution of gods  produced by state-owned firms) and between city and country, 
including agriculture. 
These structural reforms took  place against a background of  rising  infla- 
tion.Io The state bank was set up in 1921, and a new currency, the chewonets, 
backed by gold, was introduced in 1922. However, the Soviet ruble (sovznak) 
remained as legal tender, and its inflation continued  as the Treasury issued 
notes to cover its deficit.”  For at least two years, parallel paper currencies- 
the  chewonets  and  sovznak-were  circulating.  Cagan  (1956)  shows  the 
quantity of currency rising on average at 49 percent per month between De- 
cember 1921 and January 1924, with prices rising at 57 percent on average and 
213 percent in the final month of the hyperinflation.  Stabilization took place 
in March 1924, based in part on an improving fiscal performance. The budget 
for fiscal year 1924 (starting the previous October 1) was close to balance, with 
the assistance of excise, income, wealth, and a variety of other taxes, and the 
budget was in surplus in the next fiscal year.13 In April 1924, the ruble exchange 
9. Including war industries, fuel, banking, foreign trade, and transportation. 
10. The Russian hyperinflation is one of  the seven classic cases studied by Cagan (1956). 
11. Rostowski and Shapiro (1992) analyze the Soviet hyperinflation and stabilization, arguing 
that the dual currency approach was skillfully used in the Soviet Union to stabilize at a negligible 
output cost. 
12. As is well known, Gresham’s law does not apply when the exchange rate between the good 
and the bad monies can adjust. 
13. Rostowski and Shapiro (1992)  emphasize that the budget was unbalanced when stabilization 
took place in March 1924 but do not present data on the budget deficit as a share of GNP. In the 
last quarter of  1923, seigniorage amounted to less than 25 percent of total tax revenues and less 
than  10 percent of total government revenues, indicating a budget in much better condition than 226  Stanley Fischer 
rate was restored to its prewar parity against the dollar, although the ruble was 
not made convertible into gold or foreign exchange. 
The NEP led to a recovery of  output, with national income and industrial 
and agricultural output in 1928 estimated at more than 10 percent above their 
1913 levels. However, both for ideological reasons (sheer dislike of the activi- 
ties of  middlemen) and because they doubted the government’s ability to ex- 
tract sufficient resources for industrialization from the agricultural sector under 
the NEP,  the Bolsheviks were moving away from the mixed economy after 
1925. 
Looking back to the NEP from 1992, the emphasis on private entry into the 
distribution sector, the restoration of agriculture, price liberalization, the leas- 
ing of state-owned enterprises, orders to larger state enterprises to behave com- 
mercially, the role of the dual currency, and the gradual approach to the stabili- 
zation of inflation all resonate in current policy debates. 
7.3  The Soviet Growth Slowdown 
The protracted debate over economic policy that took place between 1924 
and 1927 ended with the adoption of  the first five-year industrialization plan 
in 1928.14  The private sector declined rapidly, reflecting not only the disappear- 
ance of the Nepmen but also the collectivization of agriculture, which had not 
been part of  the first five-year plan.I5 Between  1930 and  1936, virtually all 
agriculture was collectivized.  The state succeeded in procuring  more food 
from the farm sector, even though grain production did not rise and the live- 
stock population declined by half as peasants preferred eating them to giving 
them to the  collective^.^^ The consequences of collectivization were devasta- 
ting. Millions died in the famine of 1933; Nove (1989, chap. 7) provides some 
support for Conquest’s estimate that up to 6 million peasants may have died as 
a result of the collectivization.~7  At the same time, industrial output was in- 
creasing by more than 10 percent a year. 
The analysis of Soviet economic development between 1928 and 1985 de- 
in the other hyperinflation countries. Katzenellenbaurn (1925, 148) suggests that the Tanzi effect 
compensated for the loss of seigniorage revenue but does not provide data. Under the terms of the 
financial stabilization, the Treasury was allowed to sell silver coin, the production cost of  which 
was about half its face value. The inflation stabilization and rapid economic growth allowed for 
considerable reliquification. 
14. Nove (1989, 112-23)  and Gregory and Stuart (1986, chap. 4) both present accounts of  the 
Soviet growth strategy debate. Bukharin argued that the NEP alliance with the peasants should 
continue, allowing the peasants and the economy to grow into socialism; Preobrazhensky argued 
for a far more aggressive policy against the peasants. Stalin initially appeared to side with the 
gradualists and did not reveal (or perhaps reach) his final position until  1928. 
15. The Neprnen were those who profited under the NEP through their private-sector activities, 
especially retailers and traders. 
16. The livestock decline reduced the demand for rural grain consumption. 
17. Gregory and Stuart (1986, 1 11) quote Swianiewicz’s estimate that 3.5 million peasants were 
sent to the gulags, 3.5 million were resettled, and 3.5 million died during forced collectivization. 227  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
pends heavily on the reliability of Western data. There is no question that the 
official Soviet data vastly  exaggerate growth performance, partly  because 
higher prices enter the data as quality improvements, and partly because of 
incentives to report the achievement of production targets.I8 These problems 
have of course been carefully considered and, with respect to prices, taken into 
account by the authors of the classic Western studies, such as Bergson (1961). 
Their estimates and methodology form the basis for much of the Western anal- 
ysis of the Soviet economy, including that presented in readily accessible form 
by  Ofer (1987). A basic assumption is that physical quantities as presented 
in the official data are not systematically misreported. Thus, the fundamental 
difference between  Bergson’s  estimate that  Soviet GNP increased between 
1928 and 1985 by  4.3 percent per annum and the official estimate of 8.8 per- 
cent (table 7.4) results from pricing corrections. The classic Western estimates 
generally assume that Soviet investment and capital data are more accurate 
than output data.19 
Ericson’s reports (1990a, 1990b) on Khanin’s data question the basic assump- 
tion that reported quantities are not systematically biased, especially for non- 
standardized goods. Khanin estimates that GDP grew at 3.3 percent per annum 
between 1928 and 1985. These data, and especially the claim that investment 
and capital stock data are systematically overstated, would, if correct, necessi- 
tate a reconsideration of  the extensive Soviet production function literature 
(e.g., Weitzman  1970, 1983; Desai  1985; Bergson  1987a), to be discussed 
shortly, and possibly of some accepted conclusions on the causes of the Soviet 
economic decline.*O 
The central planning system operated relatively well in the heat of  World 
War 11,  when the goals of economic activity were as clear as they ever can be. 
Half of GNP was used for the war effort. Per capita consumption was cut by 
nearly a third between 1940 and 1944, with food consumption being reduced 
by half. The Soviet Union suffered immense losses, including about 20 million 
people and 30 percent of the capital stock. 
Postwar recovery, helped to some extent by  resource transfers from Ger- 
many and Eastern Europe, was very rapid, with output by  1950 about 20 per- 
cent above the 1940 level.*’  Per capita consumption had risen slightly less and 
in 1950 was only 10 percent above its 1928 level. This implies that, by  1950, 
per capita consumption had risen at only about 0.5 percent per year since 1913, 
18. Ericson (1990a, 66-72)  provides a summary critique of the official data. Bergson (1991) 
sharply questions the basis for some of the criticisms offered by Ericson and by Aslund (1990). 
19. For a detailed justification of this view, see, e.g., Bergson (1987b). It had earlier been dis- 
puted by, among others, Wiles (1982). 
20. Since Khanin’s estimates lower both the growth rate and the rate of capital accumulation, it 
is possible that the estimated production function may not change much. 
21. Ofer (1987), using Bergson’s estimates, states that output during the war years was constant 
and grew at about 3.6 percent per annum from 1944 to 1950. Maddison (1969) shows a significant 
decline during the war followed by  extremely rapid growth to 1950. The decadal growth rates 
implied by these two sources are very similar. 228  Stanley Fischer 
Table 7.4  Soviet Growth Data, 1928-85  (%  per annum) 
Kbanin  BergsonKIA  TsSU” 


































Source: Ericson (1990a, tables 2.1.2.4). 
The former official statistical agency. 
bEstimate for 1928-40,  from Ofer (1987). 
‘From Ofer (1987). 
although with significant  improvements  in education  and literacy. In  1947, 
there was a currency reform to deal with the postwar liquidity overhang: cash 
(held disproportionately in agriculture) was exchanged at one to ten; savings 
accounts below 3,000 rubles were exchanged at one to one; and government 
bonds were devalued in the ratio one to three. 
The Soviet Union rejected participation in the Bretton Woods institutions in 
1945 and in the Marshall Plan in 1947, preferring to move away from the war- 
time alliance toward the establishment of  a socialist bloc. By  1948, the East 
European  satellite governments  were  set up, and, in  1949, China joined the 
socialist bloc. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was es- 
tablished in 1949 but remained moribund during Stalin’s lifetime, as the Soviet 
government preferred to make bilateral rather than multilateral arrangements 
with other socialist governments. 
The decade of the 1950s marks the high point of  the Soviet system: GNP 
growth exceeded 6 percent per annum;22  per capita consumption rose more 
than 4 percent; agricultural output increased sharply; Sputnik was launched; 
and Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would bury the United States. 
At the time, the threat seemed real. 
All three data sources in table 7.4 agree that Soviet output growth declined 
substantially from the 1950s to 1985. By the 1970s, it was clear that the Soviet 
system was running into severe difficulties, as both Western and Khanin’s data 
show (table 7.5). If the Khanin data in table 7.5 are correct, per capita output 
has been declining for fifteen years. In addition, the consumption growth rates 
in table 7.5 would be e~aggerated.~~ 
22. Growth was also very rapid in this decade in Germany and Japan. 
23. Aslund (1990) argues that both the rate of growth and the level of consumption are exagger- 
ated and suggests that consumption in the Soviet Union was about 20-25  percent of the U.S.  level 229  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
Table 7.5  Soviet Growth and Allocation Data, 1960-85 
1960-70  1970-75  1975-80  1980-85 
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2.0 
1960  1970  1980 
Share of GNP (%): 
Current prices: 
Fixed investment  27  29  28 
Inventory change  3  4  3 
Consumptionb  59  55  55 
Defense  12  13  16 
Fixed investment  24  28  33 
1970 prices: 
Source: Ofer (1987, tables I, 3). (Khanin data from Aslund [1990] and Ericson [1990a].) 
dTFP  is total factor productivity growth. calculated by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion with weights of  0.62 for labor hours, 0.33 for capital, and 0.05 for farmland, 
bIncludes collective consumption, primarily health and education. 
Table 7.5 includes data on the much-studied question of the share of defense 
spending in GNP. The 1980 estimate of  16 percent in table 7.5 is within the 
range of most recent estimates, slightly on the low side."  This is about three 
times the U.S.  burden, which is higher than that of most of the other members 
of NATO and the OECD. 
Why did Soviet growth slow down? It has first to be noted that the pattern 
in table 7.5 is not markedly different from that in the West, except that the 
West recovered in the first half of the 1980s and that productivity growth con- 
tinued to be positive in the West. 
The simplest explanation for the Soviet growth slowdown is that the Soviet 
extensive growth model had reached its natural limits by the end of the 1960s. 
Soviet growth was based on the rapid accumulation of capital, the increasing 
use of labor, and increasing exploitation of natural resources. Capital accumu- 
lation at the rate of  7-9  percent per annum meant a steady deepening of capital 
at the end of the 1980s. Bergson (1991) makes the case that, in 1985, Soviet per capita consump- 
tion was 28.5 percent of the U.S. level, specifically criticizing the basis for Aslund's  lower es- 
timate. 
24. Several of the papers in Rowen and Wolf (1990) discuss the Soviet defense burden, conclud- 
ing variously that it is between 15 and 25 percent of GNP. 230  Stanley Fischer 
that must have reduced the return to further capital accumulation. The partici- 
pation rate of labor increased rapidly from 1928; by 1980, there was virtually 
full participation of labor, 86.6 percent of the relevant age group, compared 
with 70.9 percent in the United States. Given essentially full participation, the 
rate of population growth, which was below 1 percent after 1970 (table 7.5), 
limited the rate of increase of the raw labor  Even so, with the agricul- 
tural sector still accounting for 20 percent of employment in 1980, there should 
have been room for continuing increases in output from the transfer of formerly 
agricultural labor in the nonagricultural sectors; however, there has been little 
evidence of this classic Lewis-type mechanism at work in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union invested heavily in natural resources, especially energy, in 
the  1970s and 1980s, but these areas too appeared to be hitting diminishing 
returns in the middle and late 1980s. 
Weitzman (1970) estimated aggregate production functions for Soviet in- 
dustry. His results suggested a low elasticity of substitution in Soviet industry 
and that the returns to further capital accumulation would diminish rapidly? 
Alternative estimates use a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing 
rate of productivity growth (e.g., Desai [1985], who works with individual in- 
dustry-level  data). Bergson  (1983), imposing both CES and Cobb-Douglas 
 function^,^'  finds generally  slowing productivity  growth between  1950 and 
1975, with especially slow growth in 1970-75.  There is little doubt that pro- 
ductivity growth has been slowing, and it is quite possible that, as shown in 
table 7.5, it has been negative for fifteen years. 
The production function debate describes but does not explain the decline 
in Soviet growth. If we adopt the Cobb-Douglas assumption, it remains neces- 
sary to account for the decline in productivity growth at the economy-wide 
level of 2 percentage points per annum since the mid-1960s (table 7.5).28  How- 
ever, this cannot be the whole story. The problem is not only that Soviet pro- 
ductivity growth declined but that it did so at output levels well inside the 
world technology frontier. Put differently, the question is why the Soviet Union 
stopped catching up, given the advantages of backwardness as emphasized by 
Gerschenkron (1962) or the convergence hypothesis of modem growth theory. 
Educational levels and attainment in the former Soviet Union (FSU) are rea- 
25. The rate of population growth was higher in the lower-income Central Asian republics than 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union, implying a shift in the location of either capital or  labor to use 
this labor. 
26. Data presented in Weitzman (1983) show the capital output ratio in Soviet industry rising 
by 98 percent over the period 1951-78;  Ofer’s (1987) data imply that the capital output ratio in the 
economy increased by  175 percent over the period  1950-80.  Bergson (1983) dismisses the CES 
production function because it would have implied rates of  return on capital of  more than 40 
percent in 1950. 
27. Weitzman (1983) suggests that the data lack sufficient power to distinguish between the 
CES with constant rate of  technical progress and Cobb-Douglas with decreasing rate of technical 
change. 
28. If the CES assumption were correct, it would still be necessary to explain what technological 
choices in the Soviet Union made for a CES production function with sharply diminishing returns 
to capital when other countries appear to have avoided this difficulty. 231  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
sonably high by international standards, with literacy officially claimed to be 
complete. Educational attainment (table 7.6) appears to match that of Italy, 
although comparability of data is not guaranteed. In different versions, recent 
growth theories emphasize either the level of human capital or its accumulation 
as important factors in growth. The level of human capital is treated as an index 
of the ability to absorb new technology; by  this criterion, the Soviet Union 
should have been well equipped to absorb both domestic and foreign technol- 
ogy. The accumulation of human capital serves to offset, or with some produc- 
tion functions entirely avoid, diminishing returns to capital accumulation. The 
data show that, between 1970 and 1989, as productivity growth was declining, 
the share of the labor force with secondary and higher education rose from 65 
to 92 percent (JSSE 1991, 2:213). Thus, at least at first glance, the decline in 
Soviet productivity growth cannot be easily traced to the low level or low rate 
of change of  human capital. 
Bergson  (1 983) undertakes  a full Denison-style  decomposition of  Soviet 
productivity. Even after adjusting for educational  achievement and possible 
increasing returns, he finds a sharp decline in productivity growth, which he 
seeks to explain by examining the correlates of technical progress.z9  The scale 
of Soviet research and development (R&D) was massive and growing through 
the period of declining productivity growth, so it is not an obvious candidate, 
although Soviet R&D has been heavily directed toward the military. Bergson 
points to Sutton’s (1973) work, which shows the Soviet Union unusually depen- 
dent on imported technology, therefore questioning the effectiveness of its own 
R&D effort. He also places considerable emphasis on the lack of adequate 
incentives for innovation. However, as he emphasizes, there are no clear factors 
responsible for slowing as well as low productivity growth. 
The causes of  the productivity growth slowdown have to be sought in the 
combination  of  the nature of  the economic system and its incentives, with 
changing external conditions. This perspective is taken by Winiecki (1986), 
who examines the prospects for socialist economies. Among the causes of de- 
cline that he lists are the increase in the price of energy in the 1970s and 1980s, 
more significant for these highly energy-intensive economies than others; the 
growing complexity of production processes, with the centrally planned econ- 
omies less well able to deal with c~mplexity;~”  in particular, the fact that the 
Soviet-style economies had reached the range of  GNP in which the service 
sector expands but did not have the technology to expand services; and the 
argument that the industries of the 1970s and 1980s required different skills, 
such as innovation, flexibility, and risk taking, than the heavy industries that 
had been the engine of growth before.” 
Other factors should be added. Ofer (1  987) emphasizes the system’s “haste,” 
29. Kontorovich (1986)  uses Soviet data on innovations to conclude that there was a significant 
30. This argument provides one application for Kremer’s (1993) O-ring theory of production. 
3 1. This argument has been made about the relative decline of the United States by Piore and 
decline in innovation and its effect over the 1970s and into the early 1980s. 
Sabel(l984). Table 7.6  Soviet Human Capital in International Perspective 
Mean Years 
of Schooling  Scientists & Technicians  Tertiary Graduate Ratio  Science Graduates 
( 1980)  (per 1,000  people)"  (% of age group)  (% of total graduates) 
Soviet Union  7.6  128 
United States  12.2  55 
Italy  6.4  83 
Industrial countries  9.  I  139 
Japan  10.4  317 













Source:  Human  Development  Report  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  for  the  UN Development  Pro- 
gramme, 1991). 
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its emphasis on rapid and visible growth, leading it to neglect the long run, for 
instance, in infrastructure, maintenance of the capital stock, and the environ- 
ment. The war in Afghanistan and the U.S. military buildup in the 1980s im- 
posed an added burden on an already creaking system. The declining rate of 
growth and level of consumption after the 1970s must have reduced work in- 
centives but,  more important, increased the demand for reform, particularly 
when the communications revolution was making the improvement in living 
standards in Europe so clearly visible. The need to invest in agriculture, grow- 
ing unsold inventories of goods and unfinished construction projects, low qual- 
ity of output, and all the other inefficiencies that had been visible and talked 
about for years must have taken a cumulative toll. 
7.4  The Gorbachev Era 
The system that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited in March 1985 seemed to the 
outside world to be in serious, but not terminal, difficulties. Whether he could 
have prevented the collapse of the Soviet Union is a good question, on a par 
with whether Kerenksy could have prevented the Bolshevik coup. The question 
cannot of course be answered, but speculation on it would start from the inco- 
herence of the policies pursued  in his nearly seven years in power and from 
the decision to implement glasnost before perestroika. 
The economics of the story through  1990 has been comprehensively told in 
the Joint Study of  the  Soviet Economy  (JSSE 1991).32  Gorbachev  came to 
power recognizing, under the slogan of “acceleration,” the need to reverse the 
growth slowdown and stagnation of the previous decade. The twelfth five-year 
plan, that for 1986-90,  included a major retooling of  industry, based on the 
desire to move from extensive to intensive growth. In addition, the plan in- 
cluded campaigns to improve quality control and reduce the use of  alcohol, 
personnel changes in the party and management, and clarification of the (re- 
strictive)  conditions  under  which  individuals  could  engage  in  private  eco- 
nomic activity. 
The antialcohol campaign did well in reducing official sales but less well in 
its objective of reducing consumption and absenteeism from work. The decline 
in vodka sales also had a significant effect on the budget, costing about 2 per- 
cent of GNP.33  The other campaigns showed mixed success. 
In 1986 and 1987, macroeconomic management was affected by the decline 
in the world price of oil. To compensate for lower export prices, the volume of 
32. In addition to drawing in this section on JSSE, I use the accounts of recent developments in 
Aslund (1991a, 1991b), Ericson (1990b), Ofer (1990). and Shelton (1989). 
33. Gorbachev was probably unaware that he was repeating history. Pipes (1990, 234-35)  de- 
scribes the effect of the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of alcohol imposed on the outbreak 
of World War I: “Prohibition, however, had little effect on alcohol consumption. . . [leading rather] 
to a rise in the output of  moonshine. . . . But while alcoholism did not decline, the Treasury’s 
income from alcohol taxes did, and these had formerly accounted for one-fourth of its revenues.” 234  Stanley Fischer 
exports to the convertible currency area was raised by  22 percent, while the 
volume of imports from those countries was cut by  17 percent between 1985 
and 1987. In addition, gold exports were increased. The capital account with 
the convertible area went into deficit, as the Soviet Union found it difficult 
to borrow. 
As a result of  the campaigns and reduced government revenues from fuel 
exports as well as higher spending to cover increased investment and food sub- 
sidies, the budget deficit rose rapidly between 1985 and 1987. As a counterpart 
to the budget deficit, bank lending to the government increased sharply, while 
credit to enterprises was cut back. On the other side of  the banks’ balance 
sheet, money growth increased (table 7.7). 
A potentially decisive change in the planning system was introduced in the 
July  1987 Law on State Enterprises. Enterprises were to be given more free- 
dom  to choose output levels and even, within  centrally set parameters, to 
choose prices. State orders were to be confined to direct purchases of  goods 
for the state. It turned out, however, that enterprises preferred knowing where 
their inputs were to come from and requested the continuation of state orders, 
which in 1988 still accounted for 90 percent of  industrial production. State 
orders covered a smaller share of output in 1989, with part of the remainder 
being traded on interenterprise wholesale markets. 
The 1987 law  allowed firms more freedom in setting not only prices and 
output but also wages and bonuses. The rate of wage inflation increased mark- 
edly in 1988 and 1989 (table 7.7), adding inflationary pressure to the system. 
During this period, there was a rapid increase in the number of cooperatives; 
by the end of  1990, cooperatives employed nearly 4 percent of the work force. 
Agricultural distribution was severely affected by the reforms. Despite a rise 
in grain production in 1989, the share sold to state procurement agencies was 
Table 7.7  Soviet Macroeconomic Performance, 1985-91 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
GNP growth’  .8  4.1  1.3  2.1  1.5  -4.0  -13.0 
Gross investment growth  3.0  8.4  5.6  6.2  4.7  -2.5  -6.0 
Budget deficit/GDP (%)  2.4  6.2  8.8  11.0  9.5  8.3  20 
M2 growth  N.A.  8.5  14.7  14.1  14.8  20.2  75 
Nominal wage increase  2.9  2.9  3.7  8.3  9.4  12.3  70 
Real wageh  -.5  -1.5  -.5  2  I  -6  -15 
Retail price indexh  3.5  4.4  4.5  6  8  20  100 
~~ 
Source: JSSE, for budget deficit through  1990; PlanEcon Reporr 7, nos. 43-44  (9 December 
1991), for other data; budget deficit for 1991 based on news reports; other 1991 data are forecasts 
based on first three quarters. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
CIA  estimates. 
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the lowest in thirty years. With the cities more dependent on state distribution 
than the countryside, these changes had uneven effects on the population. 
By  1989, it was clear that Gorbachev’s piecemeal  approach to economic 
reform had not succeeded in restoring growth. Many were convinced that more 
systematic and thoroughgoing reforms would be needed and that the Soviet 
Union would have to move decisively to a market system. Over the next two 
years, Soviet researchers and policymakers came forward with several compre- 
hensive economic reform plans, the best known of which was the Shatalin 500- 
Day Plan. 
The Shatalin Plan differs from the reform plans that have been implemented 
in Eastern Europe and from Western reform plans for the FSU, such as the 
Joint (IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD) Plan, in several key respects. Obviously, the 
500-day timing is extraordinarily ambitious-and  unrealistic. The sequencing 
is also different, attempting to start with privatization and deferring price liber- 
alization. The authors of the plan believed that privatization revenues could 
help balance the budget and absorb the money overhang, thereby reducing the 
danger of an inflationary spurt at the time of price liberalization. The Shatalin 
Plan places much less weight on the need for early convertibility than would 
most Western plans. At that time, it also did not emphasize the need for exter- 
nal assistance, believing that the Soviet Union could manage largely on its 
own. With respect to the macroeconomic essentials, the Shatalin group was 
completely  orthodox,  stressing the need  for budget  balance  and  monetary 
control. 
President Gorbachev could not bring himself to adopt the Shatalin Plan. 
Doing so would have meant a clean break with the planning system, with the 
essential elements of communism, and with his prime minister. In July 1991, 
he was given another chance, after the work on the Grand Bargain (Allison and 
Yavlinsky 1991) had brought him to the G-7 summit in London.34  At this point, 
the presentation of a coherent reform plan would have strengthened Western 
support. Instead, he sent the West a long and complicated letter, which was 
interpreted as implying either an unwillingness to move to a market system or 
a lack of understanding of what that meant. Time ran out on Gorbachev after 
the August coup attempt, even though interrepublican economic reform com- 
mittees continued working on the economic constitution of a new union up to 
its dissolution. 
The economic decline of the Soviet Union continued through 1991. An un- 
usually inept currency reform in February, unaccompanied by any stabilization 
measures, had no effect on inflation. A price reform in April raised but did not 
decontrol prices. Reported exports collapsed, and it became increasingly clear 
that the Soviet Union could not service its debt. Late in the year, the republics 
34. A Washington  Post article by Jeffrey Sachs in May  1991 was also influential in putting the 
issue of economic assistance to the Soviet Union back in the headlines. 236  Stanley Fischer 
signed an agreement with the G-7 to be jointly and individually responsible 
for the servicing of the debt. However, by this stage, the republics were signing 
many agreements, and it was not clear which of them would be adhered to. 
As the center’s power dissipated, republics stopped paying taxes to the union 
government, which increasingly covered its spending by printing money. Grad- 
ually, the Russian government took over many of the responsibilities of  the 
union government, including the payment of  its bills. The estimated budget 
deficit for the last quarter of 1991 was 22 percent of GNP. 
On  Christmas  Day  1991, President  Gorbachev  resigned,  and the  Soviet 
Union expired. While the death may have been inevitable, its timing surely 
owes much both to Gorbachev’s early decision to open up the system and to 
his later inability to pursue a clear-cut economic reform strategy. 
7.5  Reform in Russia and the FSU 
The former Soviet republics are in many respects typical of reforming so- 
cialist countries.35 However, they  face formidable difficulties  even  beyond 
those  confronting  other reforming  socialist economies. First, because their 
economies used to be run from Moscow, they lack a policy-making apparatus. 
Russia is best off in this respect, but, even so, the incoming economic reform- 
ers in Russia faced thz task of dismantling the Soviet economic policy system 
and building up their own policy machinery at the same time as they were 
planning their reforms. Second, trading and currency relations among the re- 
publics are in a state of flux: the republics of the new commonwealth have, for 
instance, agreed in principle to continue using the ruble for two years, but there 
is no doubt that Ukraine is already implicitly introducing a separate currency 
through its coupon system and little doubt that it and at least Estonia will ex- 
plicitly introduce a separate currency later this year.  Third, the entire range 
of political and economic issues following the breakup of  the Soviet Union, 
including the disposition of the armed forces and the ownership of  assets and 
liabilities, has to be dealt with. Finally, the new states were not yet members 
of  the international financial institutions when they became independent, so 
that there were inevitably delays in providing and coordinating external assis- 
tance to them. The international community was able to move exceptionally 
rapidly by adrnitting the republics to the IMF and the World Bank at the end 
of April 1992. 
With respect to internal reforms, the new republics have to deal both with 
their  short-run  macroeconomic crises,  manifested  in  a large budget  deficit 
(Table 7.7),36  high  inflation, and balance-of-payments  difficulties, and with 
35. In the remainder of the paper, I draw freely on Fischer (1992b) and Fischer and Frenkel 
(  1992). 
36. There appear to be wide differences among budget situations in the different republics, with 
several republics claiming to have much smaller deficits than Russia. However, there are no pub- 
lished data on estimated 1992 republic-level budget deficits. 237  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
their long-term growth crises. The standard reform prescription (see, e.g., Fis- 
cher and Gelb 1991; JSSE 1990; Lipton and Sachs 1990) is for a five-point 
strategy, moving as fast as possible on all fronts: macroeconomic stabilization, 
requiring both a budget that is close to balance and tight control over credit; 
liberalization of the prices of most goods; current account convertibility of the 
currency; privatization; and the creation of a social safety net. At the same 
time, the government would be putting in place the legal framework for a mar- 
ket economy. 
Obvious problems with the standard strategy derive from the difficulty of 
doing everything at once. For instance, liberalizing prices before the ownership 
of  firms is clarified is problematic, for managers of state-owned enterprises 
are unlikely to be pure profit maximizers. But privatization before prices are 
liberalized is also problematic, for it will be impossible to value firms for sale 
when current prices and profits provide little guide to future performance. 
The Russian approach differs from that of Eastern Europe in some key re- 
spects: in the ordering of price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization; 
in the very clear linkage that the political process has revealed between indus- 
trial restructuring and macroeconomic stabilization; and in the importance of 
interrepublic economic relations. 
7.5.1  Price Liberalization in Russia 
The normal prescription is first (or simultaneously) to establish macroeco- 
nomic control and then to liberalize prices.  In the event, the Russian  gov- 
ernment started its reforms by  liberalizing prices well before it had any as- 
surance that fiscal and monetary policy were consistent with macroeconomic 
stability. 
The standard sequencing applies to countries where most resources are allo- 
cated through functioning markets and where price liberalization means re- 
moving incomplete price controls and reducing tariffs. That was not the situa- 
tion  in  Russia.  There  the  choice  was  either  to liberalize prices  and  risk 
hyperinflation or to maintain price controls with the consequence of growing 
shortages. In weighing its decision, the government no doubt took into account 
the fact that a growing proportion of transactions were in any case being con- 
ducted in black markets,  so that the effective choice was to a considerable 
extent between hidden and open inflation. It must also have taken into account 
the unavailability at the end of  1991 of external resources to help finance the 
budget and stabilize the currency. And, by taking a radical and virtually revers- 
ible step, it signaled that it meant what it said about radical reform. 
Analysts of the Soviet economy have in the last few years focused on the 
existence of  a monetary overhang. One of  the benefits of  starting with price 
liberalization is that the monetary overhang has probably disappeared. But the 
current confused inflationary situation is one that brings great risks of  social 
and political discontent. The economic policymakers are not likely to remain 
in office if hyperinflation continues. 238  Stanley Fischer 
7.5.2  Macroeconomic Stabilization 
In the spring of 1992, much needs to be done if macroeconomic stabilization 
is to be secured in Russia. The two essentials are fiscal consolidation and a 
tightening of monetary and credit policy. The Russian government was able to 
reduce the budget deficit by over 5 percent of GDP by cutting subsidies, de- 
fense, and investment spending. But its efforts to collect taxes have been less 
successful. The first-quarter budget deficit on an accruals basis was probably 
around 15 percent of GDP, while the deficit on a cash basis was much smaller, 
perhaps around 7-8  percent of GDP. The difference is accounted for partly by 
unpaid interest on external debt obligations. 
The Soviet tax system relied primarily  on profits and turnover taxes, the 
former collected mostly at the union level, the latter more at the republic level. 
On the expenditure side, subsidies, provided mostly at the republic level, took 
up about 20 percent of the budget and 10 percent of GDP. In their initial at- 
tempt at macroeconomic stabilization, the Russian government cut subsidies 
and relied on a generalized 28 percent sales (or value-added) tax to close the 
budget gap. The sales tax should have been collectible through the same chan- 
nels as before, and profits and export taxes should also have been paid to the 
Russian government. However, revenues have fallen short of projections, partly 
because of the decline in exports, partly because the Parliament exempted food 
from taxation, and also because of poor tax compliance. 
In the short run, fiscal stabilization will require further cuts in spending and 
increased revenues. The key to budget balance lies in the taxation of  oil ex- 
ports. The budget deficit would be closed if  a planned 40 percent export tax 
can be collected, especially if recent declines in oil production can be reversed. 
Over the longer run, structural fiscal reform is needed to move away from the 
fiscal structure inherited from the Soviet Union. Given the inevitable weakness 
of tax administration at the early stages of reform, simplicity and collectibility 
are key   rite ria.^' Unless the penalties for tax evasion are strengthened, Russia 
risks descending into the former Latin American trap, where no one pays taxes, 
no one is punished, the budget is chronically in deficit, and inflation is a peren- 
nial problem. 
The issue of monetary or credit policy in Russia is mired in a dispute be- 
tween the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the Finance Ministry over the 
need for tight credit. The CBR, with the support of Parliament, has argued 
that tightening credit now will merely lead to unemployment and bankruptcies 
without achieving any positive results. The Finance Ministry wants the CBR 
to tighten credit as part of the stabilization program. 
This dispute extends beyond the usual sniping between the Finance Ministry 
and the CBR to the crucial issue of the relation between monetary and credit 
policy and restructuring policy. Budgetary stabilization alone cannot stop in- 
37. Largely on these grounds, McLure (1991) argues for a consumption-based tax; see also 
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flation if the central bank continues to expand the stock of credit by lending to 
the private sector. Both the quantity and the cost of central bank credit matter: 
the CBR has  so far been lending at a very negative real rate, which is not 
surprising when a price level change is taking place; however, there is no sign 
that it is willing to move the real interest rate to a positive level even when and 
if inflation recedes. 
The key issue arises in the central bank's  argument (and that of the parlia- 
mentary supporters of the central bank and industry) that it is essential not to 
starve existing firms of finance because enforcement of tight credit constraints 
could lead to the closing of enterprises. In the current distorted price and fi- 
nancial  systems, the wrong firms might close. Further, given the geographic 
concentration of  industry, even if  such closings were justified  on economic 
grounds, they could devastate the economies of entire regions, as, for instance, 
in the shipbuilding regions of the former East Germany. The standard prescrip- 
tion, to formulate a regional policy and finance it through the budget, is unreal- 
istic given the government's inability to raise revenues. The provision of cheap 
credit then is a substitute for an articulated and financed restructuring and re- 
gional policy or a holding operation while an explicit restructuring policy is 
formulated and im~lemented.~~ 
This argument is not in principle incorrect. It certainly increases the urgency 
of moving ahead on economic restructuring, primarily privatization,  and the 
formulation of regional policies. However, there is no doubt that credit policy 
could be tightened now (April 1992) without precipitating massive bankrupt- 
cies. Prices have been liberalized, and firms need to begin to face a financial 
bottom line. This would encourage normal supply responses, including the dis- 
gorging of inventories, a process that would help reverse expectations of rising 
prices and move goods into distribution channels. The argument that a tight- 
ening of credit policies will lead to massive unemployment may become rele- 
vant within a year if no industrial restructuring takes place, but the fact is that 
few firms in the reforming East European countries have been closed and un- 
employment has increased only slowly. 
The extension of interfirm credits presents another major problem for mone- 
tary and credit policy. Firms are simply not paying their bills to each other, and 
the resulting credits and debts have apparently increased from a very low level 
to around 20 percent of GDP within six months. Credit policy will have to find 
a mechanism to rein in these credits if monetary policy is to have any effect on 
the economy. 
In the near term, monetary policy will need to support the stabilization effort 
if stabilization is to succeed and to attract Western financial assistance. There 
are several possibilities.  First, the  CBR may  already be tightening credit- 
there are some reports that credit growth was slow in February. Second, an 
explicit monetary policy rule, such as a limit on domestic credit creation or the 
38. I return below to the issue of  restructuring and privatization. 240  Stanley Fischer 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, could be embodied in the expected IMF 
agreement. Third, the interest rate may be raised to positive real levels-al- 
though this is not a sufficient policy unless accompanied by  central bank re- 
fusal to roll over debts. If nonetheless the policy conflict continues, then the 
situation can be resolved by President Yeltsin’s intervention. 
7.5.3  Incomes Policy 
Taxes on excess wage increases have been used in Poland. One argument for 
such tax-incentive policies (TIPS) advanced in the  1970s is that these taxes 
mitigate an externality in the wage-setting process (Seidman 1978).  A stronger 
argument in reforming socialist economies is that, so long as the ownership of 
enterprises is ambiguous, firms will tend to pay out excessive amounts to work- 
ers and other stakeholders. The requirement in Poland that firms pay dividends 
to the government also responds to this concern but would not by itself prevent 
decapitalization of  the firm. An equally powerful argument derives from the 
potential  dynamic  inconsistency  of  anti-inflationary  policy.  The  anti- 
inflationary  government  should  not  accommodate wage-cost  pressures  on 
prices. However, if wages do rise, the nonaccommodating government has to 
create unemployment, which it is loath to do. Rather than allow itself to be put 
in that position, the government seeks to prevent it by  taxing excess wage in- 
creases. 
There are two arguments against the use of  tax-based incomes policy in 
Russia. First, opponents argue that market forces should be left to determine 
wages. But wage setting in government-owned firms is not a market process. 
As in Poland, the tax need not apply to firms in the private sector-thereby 
also providing an incentive to privatize. Second, it is argued that, since real 
wages have already fallen very low, there is no need to tax nominal wage in- 
creases, which would only be catching up for past declines. Data are not cur- 
rently available to assess the level of real wages. Even if they are very low, the 
wage tax could become effective only on wage increases in excess of  some 
base rate, which could be set so as to allow some real wage catch-up. There are 
thus arguments in favor of the use of a tax on excess wage increases in Russia.39 
7.6  Enterprise Reform and Privatization 
Debates in the Russian Congress in April 1992 drove home the close links 
between credit and industrial restructuring policy. Restructuring starts from the 
industrial structure left by the Soviet system. Soviet industrial enterprises were 
39. Blanchard and Layard (1991) discuss some difficulties in the implementation of  the Polish 
excess wage tax, particularly that it allowed a period of slower than permitted wage increases to 
be followed by  a catch-up,  in which wages could increase temporarily at more than the target 
inflation rate. This difficulty could be handled by rebasing the reference wage each month. (I am 
grateful to Olivier Blanchard for discussion of this issue.) 241  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
Table 7.8  Size Distribution of Industrial Enterprises (share of employees) 
Of the 1,000+: 
1-99  100-499  500-999  1,000+  5,000-10,000  lO,OOO+ 
Soviet Union (1988)  1.8  13.2  11.7  73.3  15.6  21.5 
United States (1985)  27.6  33.8  12.7  25.8 
Poland ( 1986)  10  25  15  51 
Sources: Soviet Union, JSSE (1991, 2:37); United States, Statistical Abstract of  the United States 
(1988, p. 499) (for manufacturing); Poland, Lipton and Sachs (1990, 84). 
very large  (table 7.8), and industry  was correspondingly  monop~lized.~~  In 
1988, there were 47,000 industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union. In the first 
half of 1990, republic- and local authority-owned enterprises accounted for 35 
percent of value added.41  The private sector in the Soviet Union was minuscule. 
Nearly 90 percent of employment was in state enterprises, 8 percent on collec- 
tive farms, and less than 4 percent in private activity (including cooperatives). 
The number of cooperatives surged at the end of the Soviet period, exceeding 
250,000 (with nearly 40 percent in construction) in the middle of  1991, em- 
ploying over 6 million people and accounting perhaps for as much as 5 percent 
of  GDP. However, 80 percent of these cooperatives were operating within ex- 
isting enterprises (Johnson and Kroll  1991)-a  process that can be viewed 
either as the beginning of industrial restructuring through the spinning off of 
viable components of firms or simply as the ripping off of state assets. 
In Eastern Europe, the stated preference has been for rapid privatization. 
In practice, East European progress in privatization has been disappointing, 
especially in Poland, where sophisticated schemes for mass privatization have 
yet to be implemented (Berg, in vol. 2). There has been considerable success 
in small-scale privatization, the privatization of  small, primarily retail, firms 
the purchase or lease of which is often financed by the selling governmental 
agency. Privatization of medium- and large-scale firms has been less success- 
ful, although the Czechoslovak voucher scheme could soon result in privatiza- 
tion of much of industry-and  perhaps shortly thereafter also in widespread 
disillusionment with the promises of financial operators. Hungary, which has 
avoided grandiose schemes and encourages current management and workers 
to pursue the  sale of  their  firms subject to  approval by the State Property 
Agency, appears to be making some progress with privatization of larger firms 
(Fischer 1992a). 
40. JSSE (1991,2:40) provides a list of products for which industrial concentration by producer 
is high. They include sewing machines (100 percent), hydraulic turbines (100 percent), steam 
turbines (95 percent) (with hydraulic and steam turbines being produced by  the same company), 
freezers (100 percent), and many more. 
41. Data are from JSSE (1991,2: 15-40), which provides a succinct description of the enterprise 
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Enterprise reform is bound to be gradualistic:  privatization  of  large firms 
will take time, perhaps  up to a decade until  most of  the largest firms have 
been mostly privatized. It will also take years-not  months-to  implement a 
strategy in which the state will be responsible for a significant-but  diminish- 
ing-part  of industry 
Such a strategy  would  look much like that being carried out in practice, 
although not in rhetoric, in Eastern Europe and that is starting in Russia. The 
first Russian auctions of small firms took place at the beginning of April, but 
local authorities are not showing much enthusiasm about the sales (Shleifer 
and Vishny, in vol. 2). Small-scale privatization  would provide both a prece- 
dent and a signal that privatization is under way; it is also needed because the 
distribution  sector in which such firms operate is vastly  underdeveloped  in 
Russia. The precedent of the NEP is relevant here: much of the success of the 
NEP in the 1920s was a result of its permitting private enterprise in the distri- 
bution sector; the activities of the Nepmen brought the then predominant rural 
sector bank into the economy in an active way. The growth of the distribution 
sector would play a similar role in developing  a market economy in Russia. 
Growth in the distribution sector is likely eventually to come from new firms, 
but opening up the sector requires the privatization of the existing local author- 
ity-owned  firms. As emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny (in vol. 2), existing 
stakeholders will have to be given incentives to obtain their support for priva- 
tization. If rapid progress cannot be made in this easiest area of privatization, 
the entire privatization and reform program would be severely set back. 
Stories about the spontaneous or nomenklatura privatization of larger firms 
abound. Johnson and Kroll’s (1991) case study evidence is that firms’ manag- 
ers have generally strengthened their control and their residual property rights 
during the period since 1988 but that they have not obtained de  jure ownership 
of firms. Johnson and Kroll emphasize the part played by management and 
downplay the role of  the nomenklatura. Newspaper and other reports of cor- 
ruption in the transfer of property tend to emphasize the role of the bureau- 
cracy. It is not inconsistent with Johnson and Kroll’s evidence to argue that, in 
many cities and regions, property rights are being (insecurely) passed from the 
state sector to others, to the benefit of the nomenklatura. 
Both existing management and existing workers will have to support priva- 
tizations of larger firms if they are to be moved quickly into the private sector. 
Thus, privatization  schemes that give existing workers and management sig- 
nificant shares of the privatized firm are more likely to succeed than those that 
ignore the current distribution of implicit property rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 
in vol. 2). Shleifer and Vishny suggest that the shares be given in a way that 
directly encourages management  and workers  to privatize,  for instance, by 
allowing shareowners to receive dividends only after privatization. 
In dealing with larger firms, it is generally recommended to start with corpo- 
ratization, moving the firms out of bureaucratic control and into the control of 
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bly, their composition will have to compromise between the need for knowl- 
edgeable members and the objective of keeping out the nomenklatura. 
Experience in Hungary suggests that the pace of  privatization can be in- 
creased by  encouraging  self-privatization by  existing firms, subject to state 
approval. This process can take place at any time while other privatization 
schemes are being developed and implemented. 
A possible privatization strategy following corporatization starts with each 
board-for  tractability, say boards of firms with more than 2,500 employees- 
presenting  a restructuring plan to the privatization agency. All firms whose 
boards present a plausible restructuring  scheme that does not involve large 
externalities for a given region or city will go into a privatization pool. Owner- 
ship rights for the firms in the privatization pool would be distributed to citi- 
zens as well as workers and managers through a voucher scheme, perhaps one 
that gives individuals ownership in holding companies rather than individual 
firms. Smaller firms could be privatized through vouchers in the same or a 
separate scheme. 
During the restructuring process, it will be necessary for the state to decide 
how to deal with existing financial assets and liabilities in firm balance sheets. 
There is some advantage to a widespread write-down or even write-off of debts 
and corresponding assets, an action that would have to involve the banks. The 
banks could be compensated by being given claims on a diversified portfolio 
of firm equity and by being given government bonds as reserve assets. 
The large size of the enterprises and the concentration of industries creates 
both advantages and problems for boards considering  restructuring.  On the 
benefit side, the large firms are too vertically integrated (each provides its own 
complete range of ancillary services, such as catering, machine tool shops for 
the manufacture of  spare parts, haircuts, etc.), and restructuring can begin by 
peeling off viable parts of firms. Similarly, because the firms are in many cases 
monopolies with most of the country’s technical knowledge in the production 
of that commodity, it is likely that some part of them will survive in the new 
regime. 
The prime disadvantage of largeness is that rapidly closing down a giant 
firm that dominates the economy of  a city or region will not be politically 
possible. These are the firms that will not go into the privatization pool and for 
which Russia will have to develop regional and restructuring policies. To state 
the point clearly, this borders on industrial policy. But there is no point in as- 
suming that the Russian government will be able to do what most other govern- 
ments-most  obviously the German government4*-cannot,  which is to leave 
such restructurings to the market, particularly the market for corporate restruc- 
turing, which does not yet exist. To put the point succinctly, privatization is 
not an adequate restructuring policy. Pretending that restructuring will take 
42. On the active role of  the Treuhandanstalt in managing the industrial transition in East Ger- 
many, see Carlin and Mayer (in vol. 2). 244  Stanley Fischer 
place if  left to the market would only delay actual restructuring. An agency, 
operated with external financial and expert support, could be set up to deal 
with those firms that do not go into the privatization pool, to develop restructur- 
ing (if necessary, phased shutdown) plans. 
Within a few years, the Russian private sector will grow more through the 
creation of new firms than through privatization. Thus, an essential element of 
the enterprise reform strategy consists of the development of a legal and finan- 
cial infrastructure and an educational system to support new enterprises. 
East European governments have been concerned that, at the current overde- 
valued exchange rates, foreigners could buy up too much of their countries at 
too low a price. A similar concern seems to have arisen in Russia in the recent 
negotiations over a potential Chevron investment in the oil sector, which re- 
vealed a Grouch0 Marx-like  fear on the Russian side of accepting any deal to 
which the other side agreed. Despite such concerns, foreign direct investment, 
which brings not only finance but also management expertise and technology, 
is being actively sought by the Russian government. Russia has hired foreign 
advisers to help develop and appraise potential foreign investments; this is an 
area in which the international agencies, which are presumably able to operate 
more as honest brokers, might play an active role. While foreign investors are 
obviously extremely interested in Russia, foreign direct investment will not 
flow on a substantial scale, such as the scale on which it is now flowing to 
Hungary (over 3 percent of GNP), until some sense of  stability returns. 
Foreign  expertise can of  course be obtained  without  foreign  investment. 
There is no reason why foreign management should not be imported on con- 
tract even if foreign firms do not want to invest directly. 
7.6.1  The Financial Sector 
The creation of a viable private sector depends on the availability of financ- 
ing for both the purchase of existing firms and the creation of new firms. Fi- 
nancing for privatization can come to some extent from the state sector-for 
example, in small-scale privatization through the leasing rather than the imme- 
diate sale of firms-and  by  setting the prices of firms low enough, through 
voucher schemes. The development of new firms depends more on the devel- 
opment of the banking system, through restructuring of existing balance sheets 
and the creation of new banks or units within existing banks. The possibility 
of canceling existing debts between firms and banks, and replacing them with 
bank claims on a diversified range of firms, has already been noted. Implicit 
or explicit state guarantees would be needed to ensure that banks do not go 
under if  firms fail on a large scale. Financial sector reforms have lagged in 
Eastern  Europe, except in Hungary. Many new and  specialized banks have 
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7.7  New Currencies, Interrepublic Trade, and Economic Coordination 
The dissolution  of the Soviet Union will lead to both a decline-at  least 
in the near term-of  interrepublic trade and the introduction of  independent 
currencies in  some republics of the FSU. Would the republics be better off 
staying in the ruble zone or introducing their own currencies? If Russia contin- 
ues to move ahead on price liberalization, stabilization, and convertibility, there 
would be advantages for the other republics in staying in the ruble zone and 
automatically acquiring a more stable and convertible money. In addition, in- 
terrepublic  trade  would probably  hold up better  if the ruble zone is main- 
t~iined.~~  Offsetting these advantages is the certainty that there will have to be 
major changes in relative wages among republics; these would be easier to 
attain  if exchange rates among the republics’  currencies could be adjusted. 
Republics with less developed tax systems may want to use seigniorage more 
than others; this too requires an independent currency. Of course, operating 
an independent currency will require improvements in the quality of  central 
bank management. 
By virtue of  its size and relative wealth, Russia would be less affected by 
the breakdown  of interrepublic trade and the ruble area than would the other 
republics.  At the first stage of  its reform  program, Russia was able to force 
price liberalization on the others because they were not prepared to introduce 
their own currencies and manage their own economies. Russia’s progress to 
macroeconomic stabilization has put pressure on other republics by reducing 
the availability of rubles to cover their budget deficits and meet payrolls. Russia 
hopes to tighten fiscal and monetary policies and move toward convertibility 
within a few months. The other republics will have either to stabilize at the 
same time or to introduce independent currencies. Beyond this defensive mo- 
tive, an independent currency is seen as a necessary attribute of sovereignty in 
some of the republics. 
In any case, Ukraine and perhaps the Baltics are planning to introduce their 
own currencies later this year, and other western republics are likely to follow. 
Presumably, these republics would want their currencies to be convertible as 
soon as possible, but, because reforms have been slow, convertibility will be 
delayed. The Central Asian republics will probably want to stay in the ruble 
area as long as they continue to receive transfers from Russia. Those transfers 
could be made explicitly through budgetary  transfers or trade credits or by 
pricing Russian  exports at internal Russian  prices (i.e., net of export taxes). 
For 1992, Russia will not levy export taxes on oil sent to other republics. It is 
thus seeking at least temporarily  to maintain  the wider trading zone. In the 
43. This argument is not analytically clear cut. If a country had an independent currency and 
was trying to maintain free trade, it would have one more instrument, exchange rate changes, with 
which to attain its free trade goal. However, countries more often introduce trade restrictions to 
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longer run,  the  Russian decision on whether to  provide transfers must  be 
mainly political. 
New  currencies can be introduced cooperatively, by  retiring an equivalent 
volume of rubles within the geographic territory or by  retiring rubles owned 
by citizens of the republic, or in a confrontational way, by ignoring the existing 
stock of rubles. There is a mutual interest in avoiding a confrontation on this 
issue, so that new currencies are likely to be introduced cooperatively. 
Republics other than Russia lag in the reform effort not only because they 
are not yet committed to moving toward a market system but also because they 
lack  the  qualified personnel  needed  to  manage  a  reform  program.  Even 
Ukraine, which is politically committed to genuine independence and there- 
fore has to develop an independent economic policy management ability, is 
only now beginning to pull an economic team together-and  Ukraine has a 
large population, financial resources, and a diaspora on which to draw. Eco- 
nomic management will be a real problem for other republics, even with the 
assistance of the international agencies. 
7.7.1  Interrepublic Trade 
The breakup of  the ruble zone would  speed the decline of  interrepublic 
trade, especially if currencies are not convertible. It is often said that the repub- 
lics of the FSU were extremely closely integrated, more than market econo- 
mies are likely to be. The (unweighted) average 1988 export ratio (exports/ 
NMP [net material product]) in interrepublic trade exceeded 50 percent. For 
the USSR, the GDP/NMP ratio was  1.34, so the average interrepublic exports/ 
GDP ratio for the smaller republics would be about 40 percent (JSSE 1991, 
1:225)."  This is about the same as the dependence of  the smaller European 
economies on intra-European trade. But, because of the extreme specialization 
of production in the FSU, the republics must be more mutually dependent for 
vital production inputs than they will be after economic reform. 
The massive changes in relative prices that have to occur will disrupt produc- 
tion all over the FSU. They will also impose huge adverse balance-of-payments 
shocks on many of the republics, particularly the energy importers. Table 7.9 
presents estimates of the balance-of-payments shift caused by moving to world 
prices for the five largest republics and for Lithuania, one of the worst hit.45 
These effects are being cushioned by  Russia's  agreement to maintain a rela- 
tively (to world prices) low price of oil for interrepublic trade for 1992 but are 
an indication of the macroeconomic adjustments that have to be made over the 
next few years. 
The republics appear to be moving toward a series of  bilateral trade deals 
for 1992. These agreements avert the worst outcome, a complete collapse of 
44. In making this calculation, I assume that the services that are responsible for the gap he- 
45. Similar data are presented in PlanEcon Report 8, nos. 9-10  (13 March 1992). 
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Table 7.9  Interrepublican and Foreign Trade Balances, 1987 (% of NMP) 
At Domestic Prices  At World Prices 
Interrepublic  Abroad  Total  Interrepublic  Abroad  Total 
Russia  .9  -8.3  -7.4  7.4  3.3  10.7 
Ukraine  1.6  -7.7  -6.2  -3.9  -  1.5  -5.4 
Uzbekistan  -20.6  -.5  -21.1  -23.6  -.5  -23.1 
Khazakstan  -20.0  -7.8  -27.8  -24.4  -4.1  -28.5 
Belarus  11.8  -7.6  4.2  -8.3  -3  -9.5 
Lithuania  -4.5  -7.9  -12.3  -37.0  -2.2  -39.2 
Source: JSSE (1991, 1:226-27). 
trade, but pose the danger of a sharp reduction of the volume of trade as bilat- 
eral balancing-requiring  the double coincidence of wants-replaces  the mul- 
tilateral trade that took place in the FSU. In a simple calculation, using a matrix 
of  interrepublic trade, I assumed that, with bilateral clearing, trade between 
each pair of countries would settle at the lower of imports or exports in 1988. 
The volume of trade would decline to 44 percent of its previous value under 
this constraint, a huge shock with potentially dangerously disruptive effects 
on trade. 
There is no question that trade patterns within the FSU have to change dras- 
tically over the next few years. It is therefore tempting to argue that whatever 
decline in trade takes place is part of a process of creative destruction, which 
will lead more rapidly to an efficient pattern of  output. This is wrong as a 
matter of both theory and political economy. As a matter of theory, trade that 
has ultimately to disappear may nonetheless be desirable in a second-best situ- 
ation. As a matter of political economy, a very rapid decline in production- 
even production that has ultimately to disappear-may  stop a reform program 
in its tracks. The recent experience of Eastern Europe provides suggestive evi- 
dence that trade-related shocks can produce a too rapid decline in output. 
7.7.2  The IRPM 
What can the republics do to mitigate and smooth these shocks? They have 
much to gain by collaborating on questions of macroeconomic reform, if nec- 
essary in introducing currencies, and on trade-and  therefore also on ques- 
tions of interrepublic payments. At present, they lack a framework of collabo- 
ration.  The  case  for  the  introduction of  a  mechanism  like  the  European 
Payments Union (EPU) has been made by Dornbusch (1991) and Gros (1991), 
among others. The case for includes the need for a framework in which to 
collaborate, the potential gains from multilateral rather than bilateral clearing 
of trade, and the fear that, without such a mechanism, trade could spiral down- 
ward as each republic imposes restrictions on other republics that it fears can- 
not pay.  The case against views a payments union as a mechanism that will 248  Stanley Fischer 
maintain central planning of trade and quantitative restrictions rather than pro- 
mote rapid convertibility-a  charge given some plausibility by  the fact that 
current account convertibility was attained in Western Europe only in 1958. 
Much of the controversy over a payments union and the apparent Russian 
opposition to it stem from the emphasis on the EPU precedent. The EPU board 
did play a major role in managing trade and payments among its members, in 
many respects taking the place of the IMF (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989). 
That is not needed in the FSU, where the IMF and the World Bank are already 
active, nor is the necessary experience available in the FSU. Rather, the need 
is for a more modest organization, the IRPM (Interrepublic Payments Mecha- 
nism), which would have three tasks: (i) to operate as a technical organization 
to clear payments now operating through the CBR; (ii) to provide a mechanism 
for the extension of credit among republics and to economize on reserves; and 
(iii) to provide a convenient focus for broader interrepublic cooperation. 
The issue is usually posed as convertibility versus a payments union. But 
parts of an IRPM would be needed even with convertibility. The banking sys- 
tems in the republics of the FSU are underdeveloped,  and explicit arrange- 
ments for improving interrepublic payments, and for dealing with payments 
when independent currencies are introduced, will need to be worked out. The 
arrangements would involve relations among the central banks of the republics 
as well as among the nascent private banking systems and could be developed 
with the assistance of external agencies. Here is the first necessary function of 
an IRPM. Second, credit could be extended among the republics to try to pre- 
vent credit constraints from in effect imposing bilateral balancing on trade. 
The central banks of the republics will have to agree on mutual credit limits, 
to be administered through the IRPM, with-as  in the case of the EPU-in- 
creasingly onerous settlement provisions as imbalances increase, and with up- 
per bounds on imbalances. Convertibility is not a full substitute for such ar- 
rangements because the republics will be short of reserves. An IRPM can be 
viewed as a means of economizing on hard-currency reserves, setting up an 
alternative means  of  financing temporary  imbalances  among the republics, 
even after convertibility is attained. 
The IRPM should be thought of as providing transactions balances to fi- 
nance current transactions, not long-term financing. Given the adjustments that 
they have to make, some republics will run current account deficits for some 
years. Financing plans for those deficits will involve agreement with the IMF 
and may include separate intergovernmental agreements in the FSU for the 
extension  of  longer-term  credit.  Those  agreements could  be  negotiated  at 
IRPM meetings, but they are not an inherent part of  an IRPM. 
Some framework for continuing interrepublic collaboration and economic 
relations is clearly needed. The republics need to collaborate not only in devel- 
oping payments mechanisms and providing the associated credits but also to 
prevent potentially destructive trade and currency reforms. To this point, they 
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trade agreements. A more permanent multilateral arrangement, in the context 
of the IRPM, possibly with external technical assistance, would be construc- 
tive. It is not inherent in the creation of an IRPM that it slows progress to a 
market system; the inclusion of international agencies would help ensure that 
it moves in the right direction. 
There is one other potential role for an IRPM. It could be seen as a mecha- 
nism through which external assistance is funneled to the republics and condi- 
tionality for such assistance is imposed. There might be a case for using the 
IRPM in this way if the republics were not about to join the IMF and the World 
Bank. But, since they will join, bilateral  assistance can be provided through 
cofinancing of IMF and World Bank programs, with conditionality agreed on 
in direct negotiations between the agencies and the republics.  The need for 
donor coordination remains (Fischer 1992). 
In the area of interrepublic coordination and payments, as in privatization, 
the best is the enemy of the good, and the transition has to be managed. The 
best in this case would be full convertibility, with adequate reserves, for all 
currencies in the FSU. The current structure of interrepublic trade has to be 
destroyed. But convertibility with adequate reserves will not happen anytime 
soon, and trade can be destroyed too rapidly if  nothing is developing  in its 
place. That is the case for an IRPM that goes beyond the necessary minimum 
of a technical organization to manage the payments mechanism. 
7.8  Concluding Comments 
Although history does not repeat itself, there are interesting similarities be- 
tween the situation that led to the adoption of the NEP and the current situa- 
tion. The situation that now confronts Russia and the other republics is far less 
precarious than that of  1921. Output has not fallen to the extent it did then, 
there has been no war, and there has been very little bloodshed. Then the new 
Soviet government faced the hostility of the entire world and many of its own 
people; it was trying to create a new economic system, of which no one had 
any experience. The present governments  have the technical assistance and 
goodwill of  most of the rest of the world, they have been promised Western 
financial assistance, they have been admitted to the international financial insti- 
tutions, and they are trying to return to a system that is well understood in the 
rest of the world. 
Faced with a collapsing economy, the Bolshevik government reintroduced 
private enterprise. It privatized small firms and encouraged private production 
in agriculture and distribution; the revival of agriculture and the revival of dis- 
tribution are two of the prime needs of the present government. The Bolshevik 
government did not privatize large firms, but it did change the ground rules 
under which they worked and ordered them to operate commercially. It took 
three years after the start of the NEP for stabilization to occur, a change that 
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The pragmatism of  the Bolsheviks is remarkable. Despite their ideology, 
they were willing for a long time to live with a mixed system. Similar pragma- 
tism will be needed in the present reforms, for the large state sector cannot be 
privatized rapidly. While the privatization is being organized, it will be neces- 
sary to work on policies both to make the large-scale government firms operate 
as efficiently as is possible in the evolving market environment and to restruc- 
ture them. It is also quite possible that macroeconomic stabilization will be 
delayed, as it was in the 1920s. Looking back, it is striking that the transition 
to the Soviet system took as long as it did-nearly  eight years. A lengthy tran- 
sition process has to be envisaged in the reverse direction as well. 
There is one crucial respect in which the present reforms are completely 
different from those of  the 1920s. Government then was in political control, 
willing to use terror to maintain itself. The Russian government, and most of 
the other governments of the FSU, plans to carry out its reforms democrati- 
cally. That is certainly one of  the reasons that the West has been willing to 
support this reform effort with technical and financial assistance. 
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Basic. 
Comment  Lawrence H. Summers 
Stanley Fischer’s thorough paper does an  excellent job of articulating what 
might be labeled the “economists’ consensus” view of the situation in the for- 
mer Soviet Union. Despite economists’ reputation for never being able to agree 
on anything, there is a striking degree of unanimity in the advice that has been 
provided to the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
The legions of economists who have descended on the formerly Communist 
economies have provided advice very similar, if less nuanced, than the advice 
provided in this paper. 
The consensus view of the transition problem articulated by Fischer consists 
of five propositions: 
1.  The situation in the formerly Communist economies is unlike anything the 
world has ever encountered before. 
2.  Simply addressing stabilization is insufficient to solving this problem as it 
is profoundly structural in nature. 
3. The multitudinous problems faced by formerly Communist economies are 
all connected. Examples of newly privatized enterprises subtracting value 253  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
by buying oil at a nickel a gallon, or of privatization  attempts foundering 
because  of  the  difficulty  of  valuing enterprises  when  oil is selling for a 
nickel a barrel, abound. 
The three “-ations”-privatization,  stabilization, and liberalization-must 
all be completed as soon as possible. Maintaining the momentum of reform 
is a crucial political problem. An adequate set of transfer programs to sup- 
port the unemployed  is essential, as is a safety net for other losers in the 
reform process. 
Western support cannot hurt the prospects for reform and has a prospect of 
helping both politically and economically. Given the enormous worldwide 
stake in the countries of the FSU making a successful transition to a demo- 
cratic market system, more assistance is better than less. 
I suspect that these are statements with which most economists who have 
thought about the FSU would agree. And they are consistent with the position 
that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are taking as 
they negotiate with the nations of Eastern Europe and the FSU. So I have little 
to quarrel with in Fischer’s paper. I just want to comment in a little more detail 
on several of the issues he takes up. Many of my comments are amplifications 
rather than qualifications or criticisms of Fischer’s analysis. 
First, there is a real issue as to whether reform in the FSU is being ade- 
quately financed. According to the Fischer paper (similar estimates are avail- 
able elsewhere), imports into Russia were $82.9 billion in 1990  and only $45.6 
billion in 1991. While the exact use to which the vaunted $24 billion aid pack- 
age will be put is not clear, it is clear that it will not be nearly large enough to 
offset the dramatic import compression that the Russians are now suffering. It 
is unlikely that imports will rise to even two-thirds of their historic level in the 
next few years even if the whole scheduled aid package is disbursed. And the 
situation is considerably bleaker in the fourteen non-Russian republics. 
It is instructive to compare the situations of the FSU and Eastern Europe. 
The nations of the FSU surely face far greater problems. They are further from 
the West geographically, systematically, and in terms of past contacts. The FSU 
economy is far more distorted in both a financial and a real sense than were 
any of the Communist economies of Eastern Europe. And it is facing the chal- 
lenges of dissolution. Even without taking account of the breakdown of inter- 
nal trade, import compression in the FSU is likely to be several times as serious 
as import compression in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe. 
Second, where should the exchange rate be pegged? Thinking just of Russia, 
Fischer suggests that the exchange rate be pegged in such a way  that, when 
average wages are converted into dollars, they come out to about $100 a month. 
At current exchange rates, wages are in the $10.00-$20.00  range, so this im- 
plies a very substantial real appreciation. I suspect that it is unrealistic to ex- 
pect (or try) to contrive a real appreciation of such a large magnitude. 
For all the reasons that were given as to why Russia is in more dire straits 
than Poland, it seems to me that there is a case for setting the wage at a lower 254  Stanley Fischer 
dollar level in Russia than it was set at in Poland, where it was close to $75.00 
following stabilization. Considerations beyond the low productivity of Russian 
enterprise pointing in this direction include protection of those enterprises that 
need protection and the fiscal consequences of oil export taxes, which are more 
favorable at a lower than at a higher exchange rate, a consideration that is not 
present in Poland. On balance, I suspect that $50.00 a month is a more plaus- 
ible short-run target than $100 a month. Of course, any kind of fixed exchange 
rate is not a viable option until some control over macroeconomic fundamen- 
tals is achieved. 
Third, the energy sector should be a crucial locus of reform. The potential 
gains in export revenues from increasing the efficiency of petroleum produc- 
tion and increasing efficiency in energy use probably exceed $100 billion by 
the end of the 1990s. Right now, energy intensity per unit of GNP is more than 
five times the corresponding figure in Europe, and there are easy repairs that 
could raise drilling and shipping productivity  substantially. Investments in the 
energy  sector are probably  the most levered  investments  that the West can 
make in raising the flow of hard currency to the FSU. 
Russia and several other republics have potentially valuable oil properties. I 
am reminded of the statistic that, while in 1983 the value of Mexico’s oil re- 
serves was twenty  times the value of  its outstanding debt, yet Mexico had a 
debt crisis. I cannot  help but  wonder  whether  some part  of  financial engi- 
neering with respect to the FSU problem does not involve arranging for the 
transfer of hard  currency to Russia and  other republics with  petroleum  re- 
sources in return for claims on its oil reserves, perhaps claims guaranteed in 
some way by the Western governments who are seeking to help the FSU. 
Fourth, I think that Fischer devotes too little attention to the issue of what 
to do about the Gordian knot of the financial sector. The bank’s principal asset 
is loans to the state sector. Since most of the enterprises are under water, the 
banks are as well. It is pointless to fix up the banks if the enterprises are still 
in trouble. And, without viable banks, enterprises, restructuring, and liquida- 
tion are difficult to arrange. It is tempting to say that the right answer is to leave 
existing institutions aside and set up new banks to loan to new enterprises. That 
is happening on a large scale right now. The problem is that it is mostly Ponzi 
finance with less lending to new enterprises than to bankers’ brothers-in-law. 
Supervision surely must be improved. But, given the magnitude of the supervi- 
sion failures in the OECD, it would be unrealistic to rely on supervision as the 
complete solution to financial sector problems. 
Fifth, it seems to me that the Fischer paper is entirely correct in emphasizing 
the problems with the Polish model of nonenterprise reform, which is to pound 
your fist on the table and insist that there be privatization or nothing else. But 
listening to his description of what should be done leaves one understanding 
why that advice is given in Poland. The prospect of the Russian government 
organizing to have a board that is going to assess the proposed restructuring 
plans enterprise by enterprise, perhaps in conjunction with the banks to whom 255  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
the enterprise is in debt, is not encouraging.  The confusion engendered by 
efforts to handle Canary Wharf in the West just points up the difficulty. 
In addition to underscoring the importance of privatization, I would empha- 
size the importance of mass corporatization. This is highly desirable because 
of the importance of giving incumbent workers and managers in current firms 
a claim that will ultimately be sold. This provides an incentive to maximize 
enterprise value even in advance of privatization. 
Sixth, the Fischer paper makes light of what is a very important part of the 
Russian  balance-of-payments  protection-the  projection  of  substantial 
balance-of-payments improvement from raising prices on sales to other repub- 
lics. There are two separate problems here. There is a real problem of the large 
subsidies that the Russian Republic has been giving to the other republics by 
selling commodities, principally oil, at very low prices. This is not a problem 
that any amount of  payments mechanism is going to circumvent but a real 
structural difficulty; by accepting it in making arrangements with the Russian 
Republic, one raises the aid requirement or, alternatively, reduces the prospects 
for the remaining republics. 
Seventh, there is the question of whether a payments union or some similar 
institution should be set up when and if republics introduce their own currenc- 
ies. Here I think it is important to distinguish between the payments mecha- 
nism and the extension of credit. I believe that there is a clear case for multilat- 
eral clearing that will conserve on what will inevitably be scarce hard currency 
reserves. There is a much weaker case for the extension of long-term credits 
from one republic to another or from the West to some kind of interrepublic 
payments mechanism. There is Fischer’s point that the IMF is probably better 
at doing some of what the European payments mechanism did than any Rus- 
sian bureaucracy is likely to be anytime soon. And there is the additional point 
that the people with the least responsible macroeconomic policies will have 
the largest trade deficits and will, therefore, have the greatest access to finance. 
So for the West to finance its support for the republics through such a mecha- 
nism would be to give up important opportunities to apply conditionally on the 
basis of the pursuit of specific policies at the republic level. 
Eighth, I wonder if the Fischer paper does not somewhat overstate the case 
for infrastructure investments? It is hard to deny that infrastructure investment 
is good, and it is hard to say that having a good infrastructure is not important, 
and there is much that is wrong with the infrastructure in the FSU. But I doubt 
that it is too bad relative to the infrastructure in other equally poor countries. 
And the available aid flows are trivial relative’to  the cost of modernizing the 
infrastructure of the FSU. It may well be that support for consumption to main- 
tain the political momentum for reform is actually a higher priority than sup- 
port for new infrastructure investment. 256  Stanley Fischer 
Discussion Summary 
GeofSrey Carliner said that Summers’s advice for Gorbachev sounded like Chi- 
na’s post- 1978 economic reform program. Carliner noted that China’s leaders 
have proceeded gradually with their economic reforms and that they have had 
remarkable success. He wondered what relevance the Chinese example has for 
the current debate about gradualism in Eastern Europe. 
Andrei Shleifer supported the Russian government’s decision to liberalize 
prices before achieving macroeconomic stability (i.e., controlling the budget). 
He said that, before the reforms, the most important cost of fixed and distorted 
prices had been the incentive to withhold goods. This collapse in deliveries is 
being reversed by price liberalization. Shleifer noted that “open inflation with 
more or less correct relative prices is infinitely preferable to repressed inflation 
of the sort that Russia had before reform.” 
Shleifer also spoke about the difficulties involved in privatization, even pri- 
vatization of small-scale firms. He noted that almost all local governments in 
Russia have their own small-scale privatization programs, most of which are 
inconsistent with Russian law. Shleifer also emphasized the danger of becom- 
ing complacent about continued state ownership of large companies. He said 
that “state ownership” currently involves almost no true control rights for the 
state. Control has de facto reverted to managers, local governments, and to 
some extent workers. 
Olivier Blanchard asked whether there were lessons to be drawn from the 
historical analysis in Fischer’s paper. Blanchard was particularly interested in 
the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was characterized by both rapid struc- 
tural changes and experimentation  with a mix of market forces and central 
planning. Blanchard also asked about the existing structure of control in Rus- 
sia. He wondered whether it was still possible for policymakers in Moscow to 
implement decisions nationally. 
JefSrey  Sachs responded to Blanchard’s question about control. Sachs felt 
that, in order for small-scale privatization to work rapidly, the center will have 
to cooperate with local governments. Sachs also developed Blanchard’s point 
about historical precedents. Sachs drew attention to an episode in 1918, when 
price controls led to a breakdown in food shipments to the cities. Instead of 
liberalizing prices,  Kerensky tried to solve the problem by  arranging barter 
transactions. This turned out to be a fiasco. Sachs stressed the parallels be- 
tween this experience and the recent collapse in food shipments. Guaranteeing 
that the cities would be provisioned was one reason that the current reforms 
had to be implemented quickly. 
Sachs criticized Carliner’s suggestion that Chinese gradualism might be suc- 
cessfully implemented in Russia. Sachs emphasized that the Chinese have re- 
lied on state repression for the effective management of large enterprises. In 
reference to Summers’s point that most economists in the 1960s were overopti- 
mistic about the Soviet Union’s prospects, Sachs cited Keynes’s Essays in Per- 257  Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now 
suasion. Keynes foresaw that the Soviet system would end in an economic di- 
saster. 
Stanley Fischer also responded to Summers’s remark about the optimistic 
1960s forecasts. Fischer noted that these forecasts were not obviously wrong 
until recently. He believes that the Soviet Union could have gone the Chinese 
route. 
Fischer addressed  the issue of  rapid  privatization  raised  by  Shleifer. He 
agreed that it was important to establish rights and privatize as quickly as pos- 
sible. However, he warned that this will take at least two years,  and maybe 
much longer. Fischer emphasized that keeping things running in the meantime 
is also a priority. 
In response to Blanchard, Fischer said that the NEP experience highlighted 
the need for pragmatism and the value of getting the private sector to take over 
agricultural production and the distribution system. Finally, Fischer reminded 
Sachs that, even though Keynes thought that the Bolsheviks had  nothing to 
teach the West, Keynes still believed that, had he been Russian, he would have 
been on the side of the Revolution. This Page Intentionally Left Blank